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19841 FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
XIV. TORTS
A. Admissibility of State-of-the-Art Evidence in Design Defect
Strict Liability Litigation
An injured plaintiff bringing a products liability action' against a manufac-
turer has to prove either negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability in
tort.' In maintaining a strict liability cause of action against a manufacturer
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 3 a plaintiff must
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF -m LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-98 (4th ed. 1971). Products
liability refers to an area of the law involving the liability of sellers or manufacturers to third
persons for injuries resulting from the use of a product. Id. at 641. The first court to recognize
products liability was the English court in Winterbottom v. Wright which established the rule
that a manufacturer of goods is not liable for negligence to the buyer unless the buyer was in
a contractual relationship or in privity with the seller. 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842); see W.
PROSSER, supra, at 641. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Judge Cardozo recognized that
a manufacturer is liable to the consumer for negligence regardless of whether privity exists bet-
ween the buyer and the seller. 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). Before 1963,
an injured plaintiff bringing a products liability action against a manufacturer had to prove either
negligence or breach of warranty. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
-, 377 P.2d 897, 900-901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-701 (1963). Unless a plaintiff could prove
that a manufacturer was negligent in constructing a product or that a manufacturer breached
an express or implied warranty owing to a party in privity of contract, courts would not award
damages. See W. PRossER, supra, at 143-44 (to prevail in negligence against manufacturer, plain-
tiff must prove four elements including duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury); see also Mac-
Pherson, 111 N.E. at 1053 (negligently made product is one "reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril"); cf. W. PROSSER, supra, at 651-52 (injured plaintiff bringing warranty claim
must show either breach of express or implied warranties between manufacturer and consumer).
Compare Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (manufacturer protected against liability since
plaintiff was not in privity of contract) with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 413-16, 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (1960) (imposing implied warranty obligations as matter of
law to hold defendant manufacturer liable). In 1963, the California Supreme Court in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc. advanced the then novel theory of "strict liability in tort." 377 P.2d
at 901. A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort if the injured plaintiff shows both that the product
was defective and that the defect caused the product to injure the consumer. Id. at 900. The
Greenman court held a manufacturer liable although the plaintiff could not prove negligence
and could not base a claim on the manufacturer's implied warranty of the product's safety. Id.
at 898-99. In Greenman, a piece of wood flew out of a power tool and injured the plaintiff.
Id. at 898. The Greenman court held the manufacturer strictly liable to the plaintiff since the'
power tool was defective. Id. at 901. The California Supreme Court in Greenman justified im-
position of strict liability on the defendant in terms of shifting the cost of injuries resulting from
defective products from the injured consumer to the manufacturer. Id. The California court reasoned
that consumer are unable to protect themselves from products with latent defects and that, therefore,
courts should impose liability on the manufacturer who places defective products on the market
knowing that the consumer will use the product without inspecting the product for defects. Id.
2. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §§ 96-98 (three bases of recovery in products liability
actions are warranty, negligence, and strict liability in tort). See generally Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Strict Tort Liability] (explanation
of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability in tort); supra note 1 (discussion of pro-
ducts liability).
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965). A manufacturer is subject to strict
liability under § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS if he sells a product that is both
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prove that a product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous to the con-
sumer who uses the product.4 Courts in jurisdictions that have adopted sec-
tion 402A will hold a product's manufacturer strictly liable for product defects'
notwithstanding the care that the manufacturer may have exercised in the
preparation and sale of his product. 6 A manufacturer may avoid a court's
imposition of strict liability by showing that the product was not defective
or unreasonably dangerous.7 Ordinarily in strict liability actions, the plaintiff
focuses on the product and not on the conduct of the manufacturer in at-
tempting to show the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the
product.8 Moreover, evidence of the manufacturer's due care is not relevant
as a defense to strict liability.9
Courts have had difficulty in deciding what evidence is admissible in strict
liability actions, particularly in design defect cases.'I In a design defect cause
defective and unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer of the product. Id. See generally
[1983] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) § 4016 (as of May, 1982, 47 of 50 states have adopted strict
liability theory and 37 states have adopted § 402A of RESTATEMENT).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965). In the interests of consumer welfare,
courts will impose strict liability on the manufacturer of products in the stream of commerce.
See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900-901 (purpose of strict liability is to provide remedy for injured
person who often does not know who manufactured product). Section 402A presumably protects
the consumer against the possibilities of injury from products on the market. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965) (by marketing product, manufacturer is responsible
to public for product's safety). The theory of strict liability also is consistent with economic policy
goals of internalizing the costs of production by forcing manufacturers to bear the risks that
their products will cause injuries. See id. (courts should impose liability on manufacturer as cost
of production since manufacturer is in better position than consumer to obtain liability insurance).
Strict liability, therefore, spreads the risk of a product defect from the consumer to the manufac-
turer who is better able to insure against this defect. See generally, Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Strict Liability
Nature]. The imposition of strict liability upon the manufacturer should deter the manufacturer
from making unsafe products in the future. Id. at 826.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965) (defective product is
product in unsafe condition).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (a) (1965) (courts will hold manufacturer
strictly liable notwithstanding care manufacturer may have exercised in preparing and selling
product).
7. See id.
8. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (reasonableness of manufac-
turer's conduct in design defect action will not relieve manufacturer of strict liability for damages),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965)
(courts will impose strict liability on manufacturer regardless of whether manufacturer has exer-
cised all possible care).
9. See Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of
reasonableness of manufacturer's conduct is evidence of due care and is inconsistent with doc-
trine of strict liability).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965) (manufacturer's exercise of
due care does not prevent manufacturer's strict liability for damages); see also FED. R. EVID.
402 (evidence not relevant is inadmissible); Strict Liability Nature, supra note 4, at 838 (manufac-
turing defects distinguished from design defects in products liability actions); cf. Greenman, 377
P.2d at 901 (blurring distinction between defects in design and manufacture). Manufacturing
flaws, unlike design flaws, generally are inadvertent and result in the unintentional deviation
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of action, the plaintiff alleges that an entire line of products is inherently defec-
tive because of the manufacturer's poor design." Since the plaintiff in a design
defect case maintains that the manufacturer could have designed the product
differently and thus more safely, evidence of alternative designs in the industry
may help the trier of fact decide whether to impose strict liability on the
manufacturer of the product. 2 In Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.,' 3 the
Fourth Circuit addressed whether state-of-the-art evidence, which refers
specifically to evidence concerning the feasibility of alternative designs, is ad-
missible as a defense in a strict liability action to assist the jury in determining
whether a product's design was unreasonably dangerous."
In Tiffin, Christopher Reed and his family were travelling in a motor home
that Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. designed, manufactured, and assembled. 5 When
another vehicle struck the Reeds' motor home from the rear, an auxiliary
gasoline tank in the rear of the motor home ruptured and spilled gasoline
into the passenger compartment.'6 The motor home subsequently burst into
flames.' 7 As a result of the accident, the Reeds suffered personal injuries.' 8
The Reeds brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina alleging that the placement of the fuel tank
outside of the motor home chassis constituted an unreasonably dangerous
design. 19 Over the objections of the plaintiffs' counsel, the district court ad-
from the manufacturer's specifications during the manufacturing process. See Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 369, 161 A.2d 69, 75 (1960) (mechanical flaw in production
of steering system of new car constituted manufacturing defect). In Singleton v. International
Harvester Co., the Fourth Circuit noted that § 402A is easier to apply in manufacturing defect
cases than in design defect cases. 685 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1981). In a manufacturing defect
case, the trier of fact must compare the allegedly defective product with a presumably safe design
to determine whether a product's deviation from the intended design is so substantial that the
product is unreasonably dangerous. See Strict Tort Liability, supra note 2, at 14. In a design
defect case, however, the trier of fact does not have available a specific standard against which
to judge the allegedly defective product. Birnbaum & Wrubel, The Difficulty in Defining a Test
for Use in Design-Defect Litigation, N.L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 42. A plaintiff in a design defect
case instead must present the jury with evidence that the manufacturer could have designed the
product differently. Id.
11. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 204-205, 321 A.2d 737, 738-39
(1974) (driver's seat in automobile manufactured according to specifications but seat separated
from floor in accident raising issue of defective design of automobile); see also Birnbaum, Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence,
33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 600 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Unmasking Design Defect] (in considering
product's design, plaintiff questions manufacturer's selection of design and not manufacturer's
product).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 40, 70-72, & 76 (discussing feasibility of manufac-
turer's selection of alternative design or "state of the art").
13. 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 1194.




19. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (diversity jurisdiction of federal courts). In Reed
v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., the plaintiffs based their complaints against Tiffin Motor Homes,
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mitted evidence of custom and industry-wide practices in motor home design. 0
The plaintiffs also objected to the trial judge's jury charge that allowed the
jury to consider whether the manufacturer followed industry standards in selec-
ting the design. 2' The plaintiffs argued before the trial judge that the court's
instruction permitted the jury to consider evidence of due care when deciding
if the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous.2 2 The trial judge
overruled the plaintiffs' objection to the court's jury instruction, and the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.23 The district court subsequently
denied the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and entered judgment in favor
of the defendant. 24 Thereafter, the Reeds appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 25
The Fourth Circuit in Tiffin similarly held that state-of-the-art evidence
as well as evidence of trade custom and industry-wide standards is admissible
in a design defect strict liability cause of action and denied the plaintiffs' re-
quest for a new trial. 26 Hearing a claim based on diversity jurisdiction, the
Inc., the manufacturer of the plaintiffs' motor home, on three theories of liability: a negligence,
breach of implied warranties, and strict liability. 697 F.2d at 1195. The cause of action proceeded
to trial, however, only on the theory of strict liability. Id. The plaintiffs offered evidence to
show that the placement of an auxiliary fuel tank between the frame rails of the motor home
chassis constituted a safer design than the design that the manufacturer employed. Id. at 1195
n.2. Additionally, the plaintiffs' expert witness testified that a safer design was available prior
to the time that the defendant manufactured the motor home. Id.
20. Id. at 1195.
21. Id. The trial judge's jury charge in Tiffin instructed the jury to consider the standards
of design in the motor home industry and permitted the jury to conclude that the manufacturer's
design of the product was not defective if the manufacturer followed the customary practices
of motor home manufacturers. Joint Appendix to Briefs for Appellant and Appellee at 178-81,
Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Appendix].
22. 697 F.2d at 1194.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. In Tiffin, the plaintiffs also appealed the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence
a photograph of a crash test of a motor vehicle. Id. at 1199. The trial court concluded that
the plaintiffs had not laid a sufficient foundation for admission of this photograph into evidence
because the plaintiffs had not indicated how fast the vehicle in the photograph was travelling
prior to impact. Brief for Appellee at 37, Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192
(4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. The plaintiffs also objected to the trial
judge's willingness to admit the defendant's photographs of controlled barrier crash tests. 697
F.2d at 1199. The defendant offered these photographs as evidence in determining the closing
speed of the vehicle that struck the plaintiffs' motor home. Id. The trial court ruled that the
defendant laid a proper foundation for admission of these photographs. Brief for Appellee, supra,
at 30-35. Finally, the plaintiffs objected to the trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiffs to cross-
examine the defendant's expert witness about the police accident report's estimate of the speeds
of the two vehicles. 697 F.2d at 1199. The trial court considered the police report's record of
the speeds of the vehicles to be irrelevant and thus refused to permit further cross-examination
by the plaintiffs about the report. Brief for Appellee, supra, at 30-33.
26. 697 F.2d at 1194-95, 1197. The Tiffin court held that state-of-the-art evidence is necessary
and probative on the issue of the unreasonably dangerous requirement in a design defect strict
liability cause of action. Id. at 1197. The Fourth Circuit in Tiffin, however, equated state-of-the-
art evidence and evidence of trade custom under the rubric of "state of the art." See id. at




Fourth Circuit applied the substantive law of the forum state consistent with
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.27 Although South Carolina has enacted section
402A of the Restatement into statutory law, 28 the South Carolina Supreme
Court has not ruled on the issue of the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence
in a strict liability action.2 9 In the absence of a South Carolina certification
statute allowing federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction to transfer ques-
tions of state law to the South Carolina Supreme Court,30 the Fourth Circuit
held that the South Carolina Supreme Court would have admitted state-of-
the-art evidence and trade custom in a design defect case.3 1 According to the
Tiffin court, South Carolina would have found that state-of-the-art evidence
and trade customs are relevant in helping the jury to determine the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's design.32 South Carolina courts have
adopted a balancing test for establishing whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous.3 The Fourth Circuit thus interpreted the unreasonably dangerous
27. See 697 F.2d at 1195 (applying Erie R.R. v. Tompkins); see also Erie R.R. v. Tom-
pkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1928). Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdic-
tion must apply the substantive law of the forum state which consists both of statutory law and
decisional law of the highest court of the state. 304 U.S. at 78.
28. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law Co-op 1976). In 1974, South Carolina adopted
§ 402A in its entirety. Id. South Carolina also incorporated the comments to § 402A as the legislative
intent of the statute. Id. § 15-73-30.
29. 697 F.2d at 1195.
30. See Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prod. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 1982) (South
Carolina lacks certification statute). A certification statute enables a federal court sitting in diver-
sity jurisdiction to transfer questions of state law to the highest court of the state in which the
federal court sits. Id.
31. 697 F.2d at 1196; see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1965) (if
highest state court has not ruled on issue then, under Erie, federal court must predict how state's
highest court would decide issue). The Tiffin court recognized that courts applying § 402A have
excluded state-of-the-art evidence in manufacturing defect cases because such evidence is not rele-
vant in determining whether the product conforms to the manufacturer's own specifications. 697
F.2d at 1196 (dictum); see supra note 10 (discussion of manufacturing defect cases).
32. 697 F.2d at 1196; cf. RESTATEMIENT (SEcoiN) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965) (ex-
plaining unreasonably dangerous requirement in terms of dangerousness of product); Keeton,
Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Meaning of Defect] (strict liability theory focuses on defect while negligence theory focuses
on fault). But see Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979). Pennsylvania
courts refuse to instruct juries on the unreasonably dangerous standard for fear both of resurrect-
ing the "reasonable person" standard in products liability actions and of returning design defect
cases to a negligence theory. Id.; see Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501
P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (rejecting "unreasonably dangerous" terminology
of § 402A since term "rings of negligence"); see also infra text accompanying notes 47-50 (discussion
of South Carolina court's rationale for focusing on reasonableness of manufacturer's conduct
in design defect strict liability cases).
33. See Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982).
In Claytor v. General Motors Corp., the Fourth Circuit affirmed a directed verdict in favor of
the manufacturer of allegedly defective lug bolts. Id. The lug bolts cracked and a wheel separated
from the automobile that eventually collided with the plaintiffs' automobile. Id. at 130. The
defendant's expert witness testified that a mechanic had overtightened the bolts, and consequently
the trial court concluded that the product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous despite
the fact that larger lug bolts might have prevented the accident. Id. at 131-32. In affirming the
trial court's directed verdict ruling, the Claytor court employed a balancing test for use in design
19841
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requirement of section 402A as involving the balancing of the utility of the
product against the magnitude of the risks associated with a given design. 4
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the difficulty in interpreting the
unreasonably dangerous requirement of section 402A.3 The Tiffin court's ap-
plication of a balancing test in a design defect strict liability action led the
court to consider comment i of section 402A in which the drafters of the
Restatement explained the unreasonably dangerous requirement.", The Tiffin
Court construed comment i to imply that state-of-the-art evidence and trade
customs are admissible for the jury to consider in determining the ordinary
expectations of a consumer with respect to the product's safety.7 The Fourth
Circuit characterized its decision in allowing state-of-the-art evidence and trade
customs in design defect litigation as representing the majority view and
distinguished minority cases by reasoning that South Carolina would refuse
to hold manufacturers absolutely liable for all injuries resulting from the use
of a product.38
defect cases. Id. at 132. The Claytor court balanced the utility of the product against the cost
of added safety, the likelihood of injury, and the obviousness of the danger. Id. The Claytor
court concluded that the subsequent mishandling of the product by a mechanic who overtightened
the lug bolts was sufficient to prevent the case from going to the jury. Id. In Claytor, the ob-
viousness of the danger of overtightening a lug bolt apparently far outweighed the desirability
of heavier lug bolts. See id.
34. 697 F.2d at 1196; see Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112,
115 (4th Cir. 1981) (determination of defectiveness in design defect case requires risk-utility analysis).
Dean Wade, formerly the reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, developed a risk-
utility analysis as the standard for determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.
Strict Liability Nature, supra note 4, at 837-38. The unreasonably dangerous requirement in-
volves seven factors including the desirability of the product, the likelihood that the product
will cause injury, the availability of other safer substitute products, the feasibility of making
the product safer, the consumer's ability to avoid the danger by exercising due care when using
the product, the consumer's awareness of the dangers inherent in the product, and the manufac-
turer's ability to spread the risk of potential injury from the product by raising the product's
price or by carrying. liability insurance. Id.
35. See 697 F.2d at 1198. See generally J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABIITY AND THE
UNREASONABLY DANoERous REQUIREMENT (1981) (unreasonably dangerous requirement is nebulous
concept and difficult to distinguish from reasonableness in negligence context, particularly in
design defect cases).
36. See 697 F.2d at 1197 (comment i to § 402A requires determination of what consumers
expect when purchasing product); Young v. Tidecraft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671,
679-80 (1978) (absence of "kill switch" on motorboat that would turn off engine when driver
thrown overboard held not unreasonably dangerous because consumer would not expect "kill
switch"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965) (product must
be dangerous to extent beyond expectations of ordinary consumer who uses product).
37. 697 F.2d at 1197. The Tiffin court emphasized that state-of-the-art evidence in a design
defect case is only one element for the jury to consider in determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous. Id.; see Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th
Cir. 1973) (state-of-the-art evidence and evidence of trade custom aids jury's understanding of
defective and unreasonably dangerous requirements of § 402A).
38. 697 F.2d at 1196; see infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing majority
rule that state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in design defect case). Se generally J. BEASLEY,
supra note 35 (distinguishing majority and minority rules on admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence
in design defect cases). A manufacturer theoretically always can make a product safer, but courts
[Vol. 41:491
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In upholding the trial court's decision allowing the jury to consider state-
of-the-art evidence and industry standards, the Fourth Circuit recognized that
negligence concepts would enter into strict liability actions. 9 Nevertheless, the
Tiffin court decided that South Carolina would follow the majority rule and
would admit evidence of common industry practices and state-of-the-art
evidence that refers specifically to the level of knowledge available to the in-
dustry in terms of the feasibility of various designs. 4' The Fourth Circuit in
Tiffin held that evidence concerning alternative locations of the auxiliary fuel
tank aided the jury in deciding whether the motor home's design was
unreasonably dangerous.4' Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted that since
the Reeds were seeking to recover punitive damages from the manufacturer,
state-of-the-art evidence and industry standards were relevant and indeed pro-
bative on the issue of whether Tiffm's conduct was sufficiently wanton, willful,
and malicious to warrant an award of punitive damages.
42
will impose strict liability for damages on a manufacturer only when a product is unreasonably
dangerous. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). Under § 402A in
South Carolina, a manufacturer is not an insurer of a product's safety. See Claytor v. General
Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264-65, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982) (all products are not unreasonably
dangerous).
39. 697 F.2d at 1198 n.8. The Tiffin Court acknowledged that the jury's consideration
of state-of-the-art evidence might raise the issue of due care. Id. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
in Tiffin upheld the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence and evidence of trade custom in
seeking to provide some guidance for the jury in deciding whether the product's design is
unreasonably dangerous. Id.
40. Id. The Tiffin court reasoned that state-of-the-art evidence and evidence of trade custom
helps the jury to determine whether the design of a product was unreasonably dangerous. Id.
Comment i of the RESTATEMENT suggests that a product is unreasonably dangerous if a product
is dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer who uses the product. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). The Fourth Circuit in Tiffin held that state-
of-the-art evidence and evidence of trade custom is useful to the jury when considering the expec-
tations of the consumer in the product's safety. 697 F.2d at 1198 n.8.
41. 697 F.2d at 1197.
42. Id. at 1198. South Carolina courts allow punitive damages in personal injury actions
when a plaintiff shows the wanton, willful, or malicious conduct of the defendant. Gilbert v.
Duke Power Co., 255 S.C. 455, 500, 179 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1971). The Tiffin court reasoned that
the manufacturer's compliance with industry standards in design would be relevant to the jury's
determination of the wantonness, willfulness, and maliciousness of the defendant's conduct. 697
F.2d at 1198. In Tiffin, the plaintiff offered evidence concerning the manufacturer's conduct
presumably for the limited purpose of establishing grounds for punitive damages apart from the
evidence necessary for an award of compensatory damages based on the theory of strict liability.
Id. at 1196. The Fourth Circuit noted that South Carolina courts have not decided whether a
plaintiff may recover punitive damages in a strict liability action. Id. at 1195 n. 1. Nevertheless,
courts should not allow a plaintiff's evidence on the issue of punitive damages to jeopardize
and undermine the plaintiff's strict liability claim to the extent that the manufacturer may counter
with evidence of due care as a defense on the separate issue of strict liability. See Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (1981) (punitive damages
award upheld in strict liability action based upon evidence of aggravated conduct such as malice).
In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff presented evidence that the Ford Motor Company
knew that the design of the Pinto's fuel tank was hazardous and that other safer designs were
available at nominal increases in cost. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 774-78. Ford decided instead to forego
changes in the design in order to maximize profits. Id. Although the Grimshaw court did not
19841
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Courts have had difficulty in defining a workable standard in design defect
cases for determining whether a product is defective and unreasonably
dangerous.43 In South Carolina, for example, courts employ a balancing test
and consider numerous factors before concluding that a product is unreasonably
dangerous." South Carolina courts weigh the desirability of a product against
the cost of added safety and the likelihood and seriousness of injury.4 5 The
South Carolina Supreme Court has been careful not to extend strict liability
to enterprise liability in which a court holds a manufacturer responsible to
the consumer for all injuries that the consumer's use of the product may cause."1
In strict liability actions, South Carolina courts instead have focused on the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in selecting a particular design.
4 7
A reasonableness standard, however, involves the conduct of the manufac-
consider the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence, the California court did review the trial
court's refusal to submit the defendant's jury instruction allowing the trier of fact to consider
evidence of trade custom or usage in the automobile industry on the issue of strict liability. Id.
at 803. The Grimshaw court noted that an instruction on the strict liability issue must focus
the jury's attention on the condition of the product and not on the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct. Id. In Grimshaw, the California court recognized, however, that Ford's conduct
was relevant on the issue of punitive damages. Id. at 804. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Pro-
ducts Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1268-71 (1976) (majority of courts hold punitive
damages doctrine not inconsistent with theory of strict liability); see also Comment, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 895, 908 (1976) (when plaintiff
relies solely on strict liability theory, malice would be difficult to show unless plaintiff also proves
manufacturer was negligent). But see Walburn v. Berkel Corp., 433 F. Supp. 384, 384-85 (E.D.
Wis. 1976) (refusing to allow plaintiff to recover punitive damages except in intentional tort cases).
43. See 697 F.2d at 1198; J. BEASLEY, supra note 35, at 393-410 (admissibility of state-of-
the-art evidence in strict liability case presents court with problem of how to distinguish between
strict liability and negligence theories).
44. See Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982)
(adopting risk-utility analysis in strict liability actions to weight usefulness of product against
dangerousness of product); see also Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Ad-
ministration of Strict Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 818 (1976) (two
South Carolina law professors suggest that South Carolina state courts adopt balancing test).
45. Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982).
46. Id.; see Tiffin, 697 F.2d at 1197-98 (South Carolina has not made manufacturer guarantor
or insurer of product's safety).
47. See Tiffin, 697 F.2d at 1197 (South Carolina would admit state-of-the-art evidence and
evidence of trade custom because risk-utility analysis related to reasonableness of manufacturer's
actions in selecting particular design); Claytor, 286 S.E.2d at 132 (balancing utility of design
against magnitude of risk of injury to determine if product is unreasonably dangerous). A com-
parison of the utility of a product with the risk of injury to the consumer presents analytical
problems for judges and juries to the extent that a risk-utility analysis may direct the attention
of the trier of fact away from the product and toward the conduct of the manufacturer. See
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 181, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (1983). The Fourth Circuit con-
strued South Carolina law as focusing on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in
selecting a design instead of the dangerousness of the design. See Tffin, 697 F.2d at 1197; Claytor,
286 S.E.2d at 132. While the distinction between reasonableness of conduct and reasonableness
of danger may seem to be only a matter of semantics, the fact remains that imprecise definitions
of the unreasonably dangerous requirement of § 402A have accounted for the present confusion
surrounding the theory of strict liability. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 35, at 6, 393-410 (unreasonably
dangerous requirement of § 402A injects standard of negligence into strict liability action); see
also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Corp., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 803, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 378 (1981)
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turer and not the product itself.4 8 Once the conduct of the manufacturer
becomes an issue in a strict liability case, the manufacturer will attempt to
show that he exercised due care with respect to the design of the product.
4 9
South Carolina's emphasis on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct, therefore, led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that the South Carolina
Supreme Court would have admitted state-of-the-art evidence and evidence
of industry standards. 0
In considering the strict liability theory, the Fourth Circuit previously has
applied section 402A in various ways in accordan.e with the applicable state
law. " For example, in Singleton v. International larvester Co.,52 the Fourth
Circuit interpreted the forum state's law and found that Maryland did not
apply the theory of strict liability in design defect cases.13 According to the
Singleton court, Maryland courts would have tried a design defect cases as
a negligence action as opposed to a strict liability action, and therefore a
Maryland court presumably would have admitted state-of-the-art evidence and
evidence of trade customs.5 4 In another federal appellate case based on
Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn Co.5" recognized that
in a negligence action the focus is on the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct, while in a strict liability action the focus is on the product.5 6 The
Werner court, however, while conceding the distinction between negligence
and strict liability, found the distinction to be overly technical because the
consumer is suing the manufacturer and not the product.5 7 Alternatively, the
(distinguishing condition of product that is focus in strict liability action from reasonableness
of manufacturer's conduct that is focus in negligence action).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965) (imposition of strict
liability for damages on manufacturer requires showing of defective condition of product making
product unreasonably dangerous); J. BEASLEY, supra note 35, at 393-410 (state of the art and
trade custom implicate reasonableness of manufacturer's conduct and thus due care which is
contrary to § 402A).
49. Cf. RESTATEmENT (SEcoNrD) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (a) (1965) (defense of due care will
not relieve defendant of imposition of strict liability).
50. Tiffin, 697 F.2d at 1197.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 52-59 (discussing cases in which Fourth Circuit has
considered § 402A).
52. 685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 115. In Singleton v. International Harvester Co., the Fourth Circuit held that
the standard Maryland would apply in assessing the reasonableness of the design of a tractor
without roll-over protective bars was the degree of care the manufacturer exercised in selecting
that design. Id. A Maryland court held that § 402A was not applicable in design defect cases.
See Volkswagen of Am., Inc., v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974).
54. See Singleton, 685 F.2d at 115; Volkswagen, 321 A.2d at 747. In a design defect case
in Maryland, a court would admit state-of-the-art evidence and evidence of trade custom to aid
the jury in determining whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in selecting the design of
the product. 685 F.2d at 115; see Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 264 (8th Cir. 1976)
(to avoid imposition of strict liability, manufacturer must exercise due care consonant with trade
custom and state of the art in selection of design).
55. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
56. Id. at 857.
57. Id. In Werner v. Upjohn Co., the Fourth Circuit considered the admissibility of evidence
concerning revised warnings that Upjohn supplied with a prescription drug. Id. at 853; see RESTATE-
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Fourth Circuit in Bly v. Otis Elevator Co.5" distinguished between the
unreasonably dangerous nature of a product and the unreasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct." 9
Other United States circuit courts have considered whether to admit state-
of-the-art evidence and trade custom based on an interpretation of the dif-
ference between the strict liability and negligence theories.6" In Bruce v. Martin-
Marietta Corp.,"1 the Tenth Circuit expressly rejected the minority rule that
state-of-the-art evidence is never admissible in a strict liability action by con-
cluding that such evidence assists juries in determining consumer expectations
and thus the reasonableness of the design." The Eighth Circuit in French v.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) (product is not unreasonably dangerous if
manufacturer provides warning explaining how to use product safely). The plaintiff in Werner
attempted to show that Upjohn was either negligent or strictly liable in not warning of the drug's
dangerous side-effects when the plaintiff purchased the product. 628 F.2d at 853. The Werner
court excluded evidence of the manufacturer's subsequent warning and reasoned that courts should
not permit juries to infer from subsequent actions making a product safer that the initial version
of the product without the remedial warning was defective. Id. at 857. The Werner court con-
cluded that under either a strict liability or a negligence theory, courts should exclude evidence
of the manufacturer's revised warnings since a manufacturer will be less likely to warn against
dangerous side-effects if the manufacturer knows that consumers will use the revised warnings
in a products liability action against the manufacturer. Id. The plaintiff in Werner argued that
exclusion of Upjohn's revised warning was improper under the theory of strict liability because
§ 402A focuses not on the conduct of the manufacturer but on the product itself. Id. The Werner
court found the distinction to be irrelevant in determining the adequacy of the initial warning
regardless of whether the plaintiff proceeded under a negligence theory or under a strict liability
theory. Id. at 857-58.
58. 713 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 1045. The Fourth Circuit in Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., construed Virginia's anti-
privity statute as establishing a manufacturer's liability for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability and determined that the Virginia statute was the equivalent of strict liability theory
in cases concerning a manufacturer's failure to provide a warning with a dangerous product.
See id. at 1045 n.6 (Virginia has not adopted strict liability theory); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-314,
8.2-318 (1950) (manufacturer liable to consumer for breach of warranty when product is
unreasonably dangerous). The Bly court invalidated a jury instruction that allowed the jury to
impose liability on the manufacturer of a forklift if the jury found that the manufacturer failed
to warn of dangers that he discovered after the sale of the forklift. 713 F.2d at 1046. In determin-
ing that the lack of warning did not make the forklift unreasonably dangerous, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Bly distinguished between a lack of warning rendering a product unreasonably dangerous
and a lack of warning implicating the unreasonable conduct of a manufacturer. Id. at 1045.
Under § 402A, courts may impose strict liability on a manufacturer only for defects present at
the time of manufacture. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965) (manufac-
turer is subject to strict liability for product sold in defective condition). According to the Fourth
Circuit in Bly, the trial court improperly introduced negligence concepts into a strict liability
action to the extent that the jury instruction imposed a continuing duty upon the manufacturer
to warn of dangers associated with the use of the product. 713 F.2d at 1046.
60. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (discussion of federal courts' application
of state law of § 402A). See generally J. BEASLEY, supra note 35 (discussion of federal courts'
analysis of § 402A).
61. 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 447. In Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., the Tenth Circuit held that state-of-the-
art evidence is relevant in a strict liability action in helping the jury to determine the expectations
of the ordinary consumer in the product's safety. Id.; see supra note 37 and accompanying text
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Grove Manufacturing Co.63 admitted state-of-the-art evidence and evidence
of trade custom because an Arkansas statute expressly provided that the trier
of fact may consider state-of-the-art factors and customary industry standards.
6 4
The Eighth Circuit in Raney v. Honeywell65 reasoned that a court should per-
mit the jury to consider the availability and feasibility of alternative designs
and the likelihood of injury resulting from a particular design."
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co.
6
1
noted that Illinois courts have held that state-of-the-art evidence is not rele-
vant in strict liability actions since, according to one Illinois court, allowing
the introduction of evidence of technological feasibility would emasculate the
doctrine of strict liability and would signal a return to a negligence theory.68
The Third Circuit in Holloway v. J.B. Systems, Ltd." interpreted Pennsylvania
law and held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not have admitted
testimony regarding trade customs in section 402A design defect cases.7 The
Holloway court left open the possibility, however, that Pennsylvania courts
might admit evidence regarding the feasibility of alternative designs.7
(discussion of expectations of ordinary consumer test in Tiffin). In Bruce, the plaintiffs alleged
that the manufacturer of an airplane failed to implement a safer design notwithstanding the age
of the aircraft. 544 F.2d at 447. The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument and noted that an
ordinary consumer would not expect an eighteen-year-old aircraft to have contemporary state-of-
the-art safety features. Id. Consequently, the Bruce court allowed the introduction of state-of-
the-art evidence by the defendant to enable the jury to determine the expectations of the ordinary
consumer at the time the defendant had manufactured the plane. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Tiffin
cited Bruce for the general proposition that state-of-the-art evidence and evidence of trade custom
are admissible in design defect cases. 697 F.2d 1196. The Bruce court's holding, however, appears
to be limited to evidence of the feasibility of alternative designs. See 544 F.2d at 447.
63. 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 298 (state-of-the-art evidence is relevant under § 402); see ARK. STAT. ANN. §
34-2805 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (in determining strict liability of manufacturer, trial court may con-
sider technological feasibility and customary practices of other manufacturers).
65. 540 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 935 (in determining whether product is unreasonably dangerous, jury should con-
sider feasibility of alternative designs).
67. 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
68. Id. at 600 (dictum) (under Illinois law, state-of-the-art evidence is prejudicial to plain-
tiff's case and is not relevant in strict liability action); see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 47 II1. 2d 443, 453, 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1970) (excluding state-of-the-art evidence as
defense to imposition of strict liability for fear of resurrecting due care standard).
69. 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979).
70. Id. at 1073. In Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer
of a pressurized vacuum tank failed to affix a warning to the vacuum tank cautioning against
internal pressurization. Id. at 1071. The Third Circuit held that the trial court improperly admit-
ted testimony in a strict liability action regarding trade custom because the jury might have found
from such evidence that the manufacturer was not liable if others in the industry acted similarly.
Id. at 1073. In reaching a decision, the Holloway court considered a prior decision of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in which the Pennsylvania court invalidated a jury instruction that used
the term "unreasonably dangerous" from § 402A. Id. at 1073; see Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co.,
480 Pa. 547, -, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978) (condemning use of jury instruction on unreasonably
dangerous requirement of § 402A because jury might believe reasonableness of defendant's con-
duct was relevant to determination of strict liability of manufacturer).
71. Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 n.12 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing
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When considering the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence, some courts
have distinguished between evidence of the level of knowledge available to
the industry in terms of the feasibility of various designs and evidence of the
common practices that other manufacturers in the industry use.7 2 Since a
manufacturer theoretically can make any product more safe, courts have been
reluctant to impose liability on a manufacturer when the design of the pro-
duct is safe within the limits of technological feasibility." In interpreting sec-
tion 402A, the Fourth Circuit in Tiffin has left open the possibility that
negligence concepts will enter into strict liability cases.7 4 In Tiffin, industry
standards were admissible as evidence for the jury to consider in determining
the reasonableness of the design of a product in a strict liability action." The
Tiffin court, however, never distinguished between state-of-the-art evidence
and evidence of industry-wide custom and, therefore, admitted evidence of
trade custom.
7 6
The Fourth Circuit in Tiffin permitted introduction of state-of-the-art
evidence and evidence of trade custom although section 402A imposes lia-
bility on a manufacturer notwithstanding the care he may have exercised in
preparing and selling his product. 7 7 The introduction of evidence of trade
custom in a strict liability action might prejudice the plaintiff's case 78 since
this evidence essentially raises the issue of due care. 79 Courts should not per-
mit juries to infer that a manufacturer's due care in selecting the industry-
possibility that Pennsylvania Supreme Court might admit evidence regarding the feasibility of
preventing product defect).
72. See Hollowayv. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1979) (distinguishing
feasibility of incorporating safety features during manufacture from trade custom); Boatland of
Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) (distinguishing custom from state of
the art). But see Tiffin, 697 F.2d at 1197 (treating state of the art and trade custom together
under rubric of "state of the art").
73. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (emphasizing close similarity
between negligence and strict liability to distinguish from absolute liability); O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 179-80, 463 A.2d 298, 303 (1983) (necessity of proving defective and
unreasonably dangerous nature of product distinguishes strict from absolute liability and prevents
manufacturer from becoming insurer of product's safety). But see Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler
Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974) (manufacturer under § 402A is insurer of product's
safety).
74. See 697 F.2d at 1195. The Tiffin court noted but did not discuss the significance of
Tiffin Motor Homes' use of evidence of trade custom. See id. Specifically, the purpose of the
manufacturer's evidence was to show that the defendant exercised due care in selecting the place-
ment of the auxiliary fuel tank. Id.
75. Id. at 1197.
76. See id. (state of the art and trade customs are relevant in helping jury determine
reasonableness of design); see also supra notes 12 & 72 and accompanying text (defining state
of the art).
77. 697 F.2d at 1197; cf. REsTATEm:ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (a) (1965) (defense
of due care will not relieve manufacturer of imposition of strict liability); Holloway v. J.B. Sys.,
Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of trade custom has no place in strict liability
actions since jury could have found from such evidence that manufacturer was not liable if others
in industry acted similarly).
78. See supra note 48 (discussion of state of the art and trade custom in relation to § 402A).
79. See Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979).
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wide standard of design is a defense in a strict liability action. 0 An entire
industry may fall behind in its adoption of new and more safe designs. 8'
Industry-wide standards not only are irrelevant as evidence in a strict liability
action but also are prejudicial to the plaintiff's case.82 Unfortunately, many
courts use the term "state of the art" when describing the common practices
in the industry.83 The majority rule allowing the introduction of state-of-the-
art evidence in strict liability actions would appear to apply only to evidence
of feasibility and not to evidence of trade custom.8 '
Evidence that reflects on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct in selecting a particular design is evidence of due care and, therefore,
should not be admissible in a strict liability action." South Carolina's inter-
pretation of section 402A in focusing on the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct instead of the dangerousness of the product's design combined
with the majority rule in other jurisdictions concerning the admissibility of
state-of-the-art evidence accounted for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Tiffin .
6
80. 697 F.2d at 1196; see Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 114 (4th
Cir. 1981) (because plaintiff need not prove negligence in strict liability case, focus in design
defect case is on dangerousness of product not on conduct of manufacturer in selecting design).
81. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
82. See Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) (custom
is distinguishable from state of the art because state of the art refers only to technological and
economic feasibility of selecting alternative designs while custom refers to common practices in
the industry). The Fourth Circuit in Tiffin blurred the distinction between state-of-the-art evidence
and trade custom. See 697 F.2d at 1197; cf. 609 S.W.2d at 753 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (evidence
of industry-wide custom diverts jury's attention toward reasonableness of manufacturer's con-
duct instead of dangerousness of product).
83. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) (equating stan-
dards in industry at time of manufacture with state of the art).
84. See Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (rex. 1980) (identifying
majority rule that allows state-of-the-art evidence in strict liability case but distinguishing state
of the art from trade custom). Bt see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,
204, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982) (excluding state of the art and reasoning that state of the art
is negligence defense); cf. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 198, 463 A.2d 298, 313 (1983)
(Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting) (by excluding evidence of feasibility of alternative designs,
Beshada court sanctioned absolute liability).
85. See supra note 47 (explanation of distinction between reasonableness of conduct in
negligence actions and reasonableness of danger in strict liability actions).
86. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1928) (substantive law of forum state
controls in federal diversity cases); see also Unmasking Design Defect, supra note 11, at 647-48
(risk-utility analysis and consumer expectations tests implicate negligence concepts). Professor
Birnbaum has argued that courts should adopt a negligence standard for use in design defect
cases. Id. at 649. One of the original justifications for the theory of strict liability was to relieve
a plaintiff of the necessity of proving specific acts of negligence. Id. at 647. In manufacturing
defect cases, determining what went wrong during the manufacturing process often is difficult
to prove. Id. Manufacturing defects are unavoidable in light of mass production. Id. In design
defect cases, however, society's real concern is that manufacturers select the safest designs possi-
ble within the limits of technological and economic feasibility. Id. at 748. If a manufacturer
employs an unsafe design, a plaintiff must present evidence to show that a reasonably prudent
manufacturer would not have used that design. See RESmATEMNT (SEcorm) OF ToRTs § 398 (1965)
(manufacturer liable for negligence for failure to exercise reasonable care in selection of design);
see also Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973) (design of product
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Nevertheless, the trial judge's instruction in Tiffin permitted the jury to find
for the defendant manufacturer if the jury determined that the manufacturer
followed industry standards with respect to the design of the product. 7 Tif-
fin, therefore, cast doubt on whether strict liability theory will ever become
divorced entirely from negligence in products liability actions."
ROBERT W. RAY
B. Automobile Manufacturers' Liability Under North Carolina Law
for Failure to Produce a Crashworthy Vehicle
Automobile manufacturers traditionally have had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the design and construction of vehicles.' An automobile
manufacturer's liability for failure to use reasonable care extends to defects
is defective and unreasonably dangerous when reasonable manufacturer would not sell product).
See generally Wade, On Product Design Defects and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 551
(1980) (jury is better able to apply traditional negligence standards than confusing concept of
reasonableness of design).
87. See 697 F.2d at 1198. In Tiffin, the Fourth Circuit sought to avoid the Pennsylvania
rule which establishes that a manufacturer is an absolute insurer of a product's safety. Id. at
1197. The Tiffin court, however, in its eagerness to avoid the "frontier" of absolute liability,
permitted introduction of trade custom regarding the design of the motor home. Id. at 1198.
The Tiffin court appears to have missed the essential question of whether trade custom is ad-
missible at all in a strict liability design defect action. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 12, Reed
v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982); see also notes 39-41 & 50 and
accompanying text (discussion of admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence and trade custom in
Tiffin).
88. See 697 F.2d at 1198 n.8 (state-of-the-art evidence admissible notwithstanding risk that
due care will enter strict liability action). The Fourth Circuit's decision in Tiffin would seem
to be consistent with the "Product Liability Act" (Act) which is presently before the Congress.
See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b), 129 CONG. REc. 90 (1983) (pre-empting state law with
"reasonably prudent manufacturer" test for use in design defect cases). The proposed Products
Liability Act retains the theory of strict liability in manufacturing defect cases but abrogates
the theory of design defect cases in favor of a negligence standard. See id. § 5(a)-(b). Thus in
a design defect case under the proposed Act, a product is defective in design if a "reasonably
prudent manufacturer" would not have used the design that the defendant manufacturer used.
Id. § 5(b). See generally Meaning of Defect, supra note 32 (unreasonably dangerous requirement
is responsible for vast amount of unnecessary litigation).
I. See Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, , 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)
(automobile manufacturers are liable for defects in vehicles that create foreseeable risks of harm).
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Mac Pherson provided the groundwork for modern products liability
law. Cardozo stated that manufacturers have a common-law duty to exercise reasonable care
in the construction of automobiles if negligence would endanger life and limb. See 111 N.E.
at 1053. Since a defectively produced automobile creates a foreseeable risk of harm to individuals
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in design or construction that cause or contribute to an accident. 2 Recently,
courts have expanded an automobile manufacturer's duty of care to include
a duty to eliminate unreasonable risks that might enhance injuries received
in a collision.3 According to the new doctrine of automobile crashworthiness,
a manufacturer may be liable for defects in a vehicle's design or construction
using the vehicle, the Mac Pherson court held that automobile manufacturers have a duty to
use reasonable care in the construction of their products. Id.
While courts have charged automobile manufacturers with a duty to use reasonable care
in the construction of vehicles since Mac Pherson, courts generally have been more reluctant
to charge manufacturers with a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of automobiles.
See generally Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars,
69 HARv. L. Ray. 863 (1956) (noting slow development of automobile products liability for defective
design). Every jurisdiction, however, now recognizes that automobile manufacturers have a common-
law duty to both design and construct vehicles free from unreasonable risks of harm. See Wade,
On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 551 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Texas
law) (automobile manufacturer held liable for injuries incurred in accident caused by failure of
headlights); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1930) (applying Kentucky
law) (liability imposed on manufacturer for defects in steering assembly that caused crash); Mac
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, .L., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (1916) (manufacturer
held liable for negligence when defectively built wheel collapsed causing accident); see also Hoenig,
Resolution of "Crashworthiness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 633, 635 (1981) (tradi-
tional automobile products liability law focused on defects in vehicles that caused accidents).
Until recently, courts refused to hold an automobile manufacturer liable for defects in design
or construction that did not precipitate the collision. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir.) (automobile manufacturer not liable for allegedly defective frame
design that did not cause or contribute to accident), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), rev'd,
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp.
1010, 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (manufacturer not liable for defective construction of vehicle's cab
that split in two during collision since defect did not cause crash). In the Evans case, the plaintiff
claimed that the manufacturer's negligent design of the automobile's frame caused her husband's
fatal injuries. See 359 F.2d at 824. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding
that an automobile manufacturer does not have a duty to construct or design a crash-proof vehi-
cle. Id. The Evans court reasoned that an automobile manufacturer only had to ensure that the
vehicle was reasonably fit for its intended purpose, which did not include collisions. Id. at 825;
see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 395 (1965) (manufacturer is liable only when consumer
used product in foreseeable manner). Since an automobile's intended purpose does not include
its involvement in collisions, the Evans court concluded that automobile manufacturers did not
have a duty to design or build a vehicle that minimized accident-related injuries. See 359 F.2d
at 825. The Seventh Circuit also stated that the imposition of a duty to design a crash-proof
vehicle was primarily a legislative function, and not a proper subject for the judiciary. Id. at 824.
3. See, e.g., Carazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981)
(applying New York law) (automobile manufacturer has duty to design and construct vehicles
free from unreasonable risks of harm that could increase injuries received in collisions); Smith
v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying Florida law) (automobile
manufacturer has duty to eliminate defects that may cause unreasonable risks of foreseeable in-
jury); Huddel v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law) (automobile
manufacture must take reasonable steps to design and produce vehicle that will minimize foreseeable
risks of injury); Nanda v. Ford Motor Company, 509 F.2d 213, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying
Illinois law) (manufacturer has duty to construct and design vehicles that do not subject users
to unreasonable risks of injury during collisions).
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that allegedly aggravated the plaintiff's accident-related injuries. 4 Although
the majority of jurisdictions that have examined the crashworthiness doctrine
have incorporated the doctrine into the state's product liability law, several
states have not yet addressed the issue of automobile crashworthiness.5 Since
North Carolina courts have never examined the issue of crashworthiness liability,
federal diversity courts applying North Carolina law have had to predict 6
4. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (automobile
manufacture is liable for defects in vehicle's design or construction that create unreasonable risks
of injury). Larsen is the leading case on the doctrine of automobile crashworthiness. In Larsen,
the Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the "intended purpose" rationale used by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Evans to limit an automobile manufacturer's duty of care. Id. at 502; see supra note
2 (discussion of Evans). The Larsen court determined that the scope of a manufacturer's duty
of reasonable care depends on the foreseeability of injury. See 391 F.2d at 502-03. Since injury-
producing collisions are a foreseeable use of an automobile, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that
the manufacturer's duty of care should include the elimination of unreasonable risks that might
enhance injuries during a collision. Id. The Larsen court therefore found no rational basis for
distinguishing between defects that cause an accident and defects that aggravate injuries received
in an accident. Id. at 502. See generally Comment, Products Liability - Automobile Manufac-
turers Must Design and Build a Crashworthy Automobile, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 219, 223-25
(1977) (discussing Eighth Circuit's holding in Larsen).
Under the crashworthiness doctrine, a court focuses on the vehicle's performance in minimizing
the plaintiff's accident-related injuries. See Hoenig, supra note 2, at 636. The inquiry in crash-
worthiness cases therefore focuses on the extent to which a vehicle's alleged defects in design
or construction unreasonably aggravated the plaintiff's injuries. Id.; see, e.g., Seese v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 834 (3d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff alleged that manufacturer negligently
constructed van windows that popped out during collision causing enhanced injury); Feitzer v.
Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215, 216 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (plaintiff claimed that defect
in design of fuel system caused increased injuries when car exploded during collision); Perez v.
Ford Motor Company, 497 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1974) (complaint alleged that negligent construc-
tion of truck caused cab to separate from chassis during collision resulting in aggravated in-
juries); Marshall v. Ford Motor Company, 446 F.2d 712, 713 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff claimed
that manufacturer's failure to equip folding bucket seat of vehicle with locking devices caused
enhanced injuries during crash); see also Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Se-
cond Collision" and "Crashworthiness" Cases, 16 WAsHBURN L.J. 600, 607 (crashworthiness
case involves allegation that defect made vehicle unsafe to occupy during collision and aggravated
passenger's injuries).
5. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1977) (listing jurisdic-
tions that have adopted crashworthiness doctrine). In overruling Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
the Huff court noted that the overwhelming majority of courts have adopted the crashworthiness
doctrine since the Seventh Circuit's decision in Evans. Id. at 107. The Huff court observed that
thirty jurisdictions have adopted the crashworthiness doctrine while only three jurisdictions have
rejected the doctrine. Id. Thus, seventeen jurisdictions have not yet addressed the issue of crash-
worthiness liability.
6. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). According to the Erie doctrine, federal
courts deciding diversity cases cannot refer to any fictional body of "federal common law",
but must apply state law as pronounced by the forum's highest court. Id. at 78. When the law
of the forum state is unclear, the federal diversity court must predict how the forum state's courts
would decide the contested issues. Id. A federal court, however, is not permitted to predict state
law according to individual preferences. See McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240, 240
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973). Federal diversity courts instead must predict state
law based on factors indicative of how the forum's highest court would resolve the legal issue.
See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir.) (federal diversity court
predicting state law must consider all evidence tending to show how state's highest court would
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whether the state courts would allow recovery on a crashworthiness claim. 7
The Federal courts that have construed North Carolina law have not agreed
on whether North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine.' Federal
courts predicting that North Carolina would reject the doctrine reason that
North Carolina courts would refuse to hold an automobile manufacturer liable
unless the manufacturer's negligence caused or contributed to the accident."
Conversely, courts holding that North Carolina would adopt the crash-
worthiness doctrine reason that the state courts would find no rational basis
for distinguishing between defects that cause an accident and defects that cause
enhanced injuries.'I In a diversity case involving North Carolina law, the Fourth
Circuit in Wilson v. Ford Motor Company" predicted that the North Carolina
courts would reject the crashworthiness doctrine.' The Wilson court reasoned
that since current North Carolina tort law identifies the initial automobile col-
lision as the sole proximate cause of all accident-related injuries, North Carolina
courts would not accept the crashworthiness theory of liability.' 3 In Martin
decide issue), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). See generally lA J. MooRE, W. TAGGERT &
J. WIcKES, MooRE's FEDERAL PRacTIcE 309 pp. 3117-29 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing how federal
diversity courts ascertain state law) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE]. Federal
courts must predict state law by referring to recent state court pronouncements on analogous
issues, dicta from relevant state court opinions, and other evidence of how the forum's courts
view a particular issue. See MooRaE's FEDERAL PRACTICE supra at 3117-29.
7. See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing different federal court predic-
tions regarding whether North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine). Of the thirty-
three cases cited in Huff that dealt with the crashworthiness issue, fourteen involved a federal
diversity court's application of state law. See 565 F.2d at 110-11; e.g., Driesonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974) (predicting Virginia state courts would
adopt crashworthiness doctrine); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17, 20-1 (S.D.W.Va.
1971) (holding that plaintiff's allegations that vehicles negligent design enhanced injuries did not
state claim under West Virginia law), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
8. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court predic-
tions of North Carolina law).
9. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445, 447 (M.D.N.C. 1977)
(predicting North Carolina courts would not impose liability for allegedly dangerous condition
in passenger compartment); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320, 323 (W.D.
N.C. 1971) (predicting North Carolina courts would not hold automobile manufacturer liable
for allegedly defective gas tank design). The district court in Alexander predicted that North
Carolina courts would reject the crashworthiness doctrine in a case in which the automobile's
gas tank exploded with the vehicle collided with a train. See 346 F.2d at 321-27. The Alexander
court held that under North Carolina law an automobile manufacturer is not liable for negligence
that does not cause or contribute fo the accident. Id. at 323. See also Bulliner v. General Motors
Corporation, 54 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (North Carolina law requires plaintiff to establish
causal connection between alleged negligence of manufacturer and accident).
10. See, e.g., Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 840-41 (3d Cir. 1981) (pre-
dicting North Carolina courts would adopt crashworthiness doctrine); Seeley v. Ford Motor Co.,
499 F. Supp. 475, 479 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (same); Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp.
1, 7 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (same). In Isaacson, the district court stressed that North Carolina courts
would hold that an automobile manufacturer's duty to design and construct a reasonably safe
vehicle extends to eliminating unreasonable risks of harm during a collision. See 438 F. Supp. at 8.
11. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
12. Id.
13. Id. The Wilson court noted that the Third Circuit in Seese predicted that North Carolina
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v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 14 the Fourth Circuit recently readdressed the
issue of whether North Carolina courts would allow recovery on a crashwor-
thiness claim.' 5 In a per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the
Wilson court's prediction that North Carolina would not adopt the crashwor-
thiness doctrine and extend liability to automobile manufacturers for failure
to produce a crashworthy vehicle.' 6
In Martin, the plaintiffs' decedents were killed when their 1964 Volkswagen
sedan burst into flames after being struck head-on by another automobile.'
The plaintiffs filed a diversity action in the Western District of North Carolina
based on North Carolina's wrongful death statute. 8 The plaintiffs did not
allege that the defendant's negligence caused or contributed to the fatal crash. I
Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had negligently designed and
manufactured the decedent's automobile.2" The plaintiffs contended that the
defendant's negligent design and construction of the automobile's fuel system
caused the fire that led to the fatalities.2 ' At trial, the defendant moved for
dismissal and summary judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.2 The defendant urged that according to Wilson, North Carolina
law does not allow recovery under a crashworthiness theory, and therefore
the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.23 The district court, however,
concluded that Wilson was not controlling on the crashworthiness issue, and
denied the defendant's motions.24 The district court reasoned that the Wilson
would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine. See id. at 960 n.1; infra notes 63-65 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Seese court's prediction). The Fourth Circuit, however, pointed out that the
North Carolina Supreme Court's recent rejection of strict liability supported the conclusion that
the state courts also would reject the crashworthiness doctrine. See 656 F.2d at 960-61 n.l; Smith
v. Fiber Control Corporation, 300 N.C. 669, 678, 268 S.E.2d 504, 510 (1980) (doctrine of strict
liability not applicable in product liability cases in North Carolina).
14. 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 824.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A.18-2 (1982) (personal representation may sue on behalf
of decedent if death caused by wrongful act of another party).
19. See 707 F.2d at 824.
20. Id.
21. See Brief for Appellee at 3, Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 707 F.2d 823
(4th Cir. 1983).
22. See 707 F.2d at 824.
23. See id. In Wilson, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the plain-
tiff's claim that defects in the construction of his van aggravated the injuries he received in the
collision. See Wilson v. Ford Motor Company, 656 F.2d 960, 960 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
The defendant in Martin relied on the Wilson court's holding that under North Carolina law
a plaintiff does not state a valid claim unless the plaintiff alleges a causal connection between
the defendant's negligence and the collision. See Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Martin v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983); see Bulliner v. General Motors Corporation,
54 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. N.C. 1971) (under North Carolina law plaintiff must allege causal
connection between negligence of automobile manufacturer and accident).
24. See Martin v. Smith, 534 F. Supp. 804, 808 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (Wilson does not control
on issue of whether North Carolina would adopt crashworthiness doctrine).
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holding was not controlling because it was inconsistent with accepted prin-
ciples of North Carolina tort law.25 The district court therefore refused to
apply Wilson as binding precedent in Martin.2 6 On appeal to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the defendant claimed that the district court had erroneously interpreted
both Wilson and North Carolina law in denying the motions for dismissal
and summary judgment.
27
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the defendant, and reversed the judgment
of the district court.2" In a per curiam opinion, the Martin court held that
the Wilson prediction that North Carolina would reject the crashworthiness
doctrine was valid and therefore controlling. 29 Since Martin and Wilson were
factually indistinguishable, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the district court
should have granted the defendant's motions on the authority of Wilson.3 0
A special concurrence in Martin responded to a dissent 3' from the Fourth Cir-
cuit's denial of a rehearing en banc on the crashworthiness issue. 32 By dispos-
ing of the appeal on procedural grounds, the Martin court never reached the
substantive merits of the plaintiff's crashworthiness claim.
33
While the per curiam opinion in Martin never addressed the substantive
basis for a crashworthiness cause of action, the concurrence did examine the
principles underlying the crashworthiness doctrine. 34 The concurrence noted
that the pivotal issue for courts deciding whether to adopt the crashworthiness
doctrine is the identification of the proximate cause of the claimant's injuries.35
The concurrence explained that courts accepting the crashworthiness doctrine
hold a manufacturer liable for defects in the automobile that did not prox-
imately cause the collision, but did cause increased injuries during the crash. 36
25. Id. at 806. The district court in Martin specifically rejected the Wilson court's deter-
mination that the North Carolina courts would not accept the causation analysis used in crash-
worthiness cases. Id. at 806-07; see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing theory
of recovery under crashworthiness doctrine).
26. See 534 F. Supp. at 808.
27. See 707 F.2d at 824; Appellant's Brief at 6-9, Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983).
28. See 707 F.2d at 824.
29. Id.
30. Id. The district judge found the complaint in Martin distinguishable from the pleadings
in Wilson. See 534 F. Supp. at 806. The district judge noted that the claimant in Wilson alleged
that the defects in the automobile had aggravated the injuries he received in the collision. Id.
Conversely, in Martin the plaintiffs alleged that the design defects proximately caused the dece-
dent's deaths. Id. Since the plaintiffs in Martin pleaded a different cause of action than the plain-
tiff in Wilson, the district judge refused to dismiss the complaint in Martin solely on the basis
of the dismissal of the crashworthiness claim in Wilson. Id.
31. See 707 F.2d at 827-28 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); infra notes 58-73 and accompany-
ing text (discussing dissenting opinion in Martin).
32. See 707 F.2d at 825-27 (Phillips, J., concurring specially); infra notes 34-44 and
accompanying text (discussing concurring opinion in Martin).
33. See 707 F.2d at 824.
34. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing Martin's special concurrence's
analysis of crashworthiness doctrine).
35. See 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, J., concurring specially).
36. Id. at 826-27 (Phillips, J., concurring specially). The concurrence in Martin noted that
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The Martin concurrence stated that courts rejecting the crashworthiness doc-
trine refuse to hold an automobile manufacturer liable for defects that have
no causal connection to the initial collision. 37 According to the concurrence,
courts rejecting the crashworthiness doctrine consider the initial collision to
be the sole proximate cause of all ensuing injuries, and therefore impose lia-
bility only on the actor whose negligence caused or contributed to the accident.
3 8
Since the analysis of the causation issue is the salient question in crash-
worthiness cases, the concurrence in Martin sought to ascertain how North
Carolina courts define proximate cause. 39 The concurrence focused on the North
Carolina Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Miller," a case that examined
the issue of proximate causation in the context of automobile accidents. 4 The
concurring opinion noted that the Miller court had identified the initial colli-
sion as the sole proximate cause of resulting injuries.42 Although the concur-
rence acknowledged that Miller did not involve a crashworthiness claim, the
concurrence reasoned that North Carolina courts would reject the crashwor-
thiness doctrine because the Miller court refused to impose liability on an ac-
tor whose negligence did not cause the accident.4 3 The Martin concurrence
therefore concluded that North Carolina case law supported the Wilson predic-
tion that North Carolina courts would reject the crashworthiness doctrine."
courts that impose liability for uncrashworthy automobiles do not consider the initial collision
to be the sole proximate cause of all accident-related injuries. Id. at 827. Rather, the concurrence
stated that courts accepting the crashworthiness doctrine distinguish injuries attributable to the
force of the collision from injuries arguably traceable to defects in the vehicle's design or con-
struction. Id.
37. See 707 F.2d at 827 (Phillips, J., concurring specially); e.g., McClung v. Ford Motor
Company, 472 F.2d 240, 240 (4th Cir. 1973) (predicting that West Virginia courts would not
allow recovery in crashworthiness cases if alleged defect in automobile did not cause or con-
tribute to collision); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568, 570 (Miss. 1970) (automobile
manufacturer not liable if defect in vehicle did not cause accident).
38. See 707 F.2d at 827.
39. Id; see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing concurrence's analysis in
Martin of North Carolina Supreme Court decision regarding proximate causation).
40. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
41. See 707 F.2d at 827. In Miller, the plaintiff received severe injuries during a collision
with the defendant's automobile. See 160 S.E.2d at 67. The defendant urged that the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt constituted contributory negligence, barring recovery for injuries received
in the collision. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, refused to hold the plaintiff
contributorily negligent. Id. The Miller court reasoned that although the plaintiff may have been
negligent in failing to wear a seat belt, the alleged negligence did not contribute to the occurrence
of the accident. Id. at 68.
42. See 707 F.2d at 827; supra note 41 (Miller court refused to hold that plaintiff's failure
to wear seat belt was a proximate cause of injury).
43. See 707 F.2d at 827. While the Martin concurrence conceded that Miller was not a
crashworthiness case, the concurrence emphasized that Miller involved the closely related ques-
tion of whether a negligent act that did not contribute to the accident is a proximate cause of
injuries received in the collision. Id. at 826. Since North Carolina's highest court in Miller iden-
tified the initial collision as the sole proximate cause of all accident-related injuries, the Martin
concurrence reasoned that North Carolina courts would not hold an automobile manufacturer
liable for defects that had no causal role in the collision. See id. at 827.
44. See id. at 827.
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In further support of the Wilson decision, the concurring opinion noted
several aspects of the North Carolina courts that indicate a conservative at-
titude towards expansive tort doctrines like crashworthiness. 5 The Martin con-
currence first pointed out that North Carolina courts have never addressed
the crashworthiness doctrine, even though the state courts could have examined
the doctrine in cases that raised analogous legal issues." The concurrence fur-
ther noted that North Carolina courts have refrained from liberalizing tort
recovery through such doctrines as strict liability and comparative fault. 7 The
Martin concurrence explained that the hesitancy of the North Carolina courts
in substantially altering common-law tort rules reflects an attitude of judicial
restraint and deference to the legislature as the proper forum for implemen-
ting such changes."' The concurrence concluded that the Wilson court had
properly considered North Carolina's reluctance in following other trends in
tort law when predicting that the state courts would not adopt the crash-
worthiness doctrine.
9
Additionally, the concurrence in Martin urged that the Wilson holding
was correct because the prediction was based on relevant indicators of North
Carolina state law.5 0 The concurrence explained that when the courts of the
forum state are silent on a particular issue, federal diversity courts applying
state law must predict how the courts of that state would decide the issue."
The concurring opinion emphasized that federal courts should base their predic-
tions of state law primarily on pertinent legal principles reflected in state court
decisions.5 " The concurrence reasoned that state court holdings on analogous
or related legal questions are indicative of how the state courts would resolve
45. See id. at 826-27; infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing other evidence
indicating that North Carolina courts would not adopt crashworthiness doctrine).
46. See 707 F.2d at 826. The Martin concurrence noted that the North Carolina Supreme
Court could have addressed the crashworthiness doctrine in Miller when the Court examined
the issue of whether the plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt was a proximate cause of injury.
Id.; supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Miller). The concurrence in Martin
suggested that the Miller court's failure to address the crashworthiness issues implied that the
North Carolina Supreme Court did not recognize the validity of the crashworthiness doctrine.
See 707 F.2d at 826.
47. See 707 F.2d at 826. North Carolina is one of the few jurisdictions that does not allow
recovery for personal injury under a theory of strict liability. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
648 F.2d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1981) (district court applying North Carolina law erred in permitting
crashworthiness case to proceed on theory of strict liability); Smith v. Fiber Control Corpora-
tion, 300 N.C. 669, 678, 268 S.E.2d 504, 510 (1980) (strict liability doctrine is not applicable
in products liability cases).
48. See 707 F.2d at 826.
49. Id.
50. See 707 F.2d at 825.
51. Id.; see supra note 6 (discussing federal diversity court prediction of state law).
52. See 707 F.2d at 825; Jones of Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
626 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1980) (to accurately predict state law, federal diversity court should
examine all relevant sources of pertinent state law including related decisions of forum's state
courts). See generally MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE, supra note 6, at 3120-3129 (noting that federal
diversity courts predicting state law should consider all relevant evidence regarding how forum
state's courts view a particular issue).
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the contested issue. 3 The concurrence in Martin stressed that federal diversity
courts should look foremost to relevant state court decisions when predicting
state law, and must avoid predicting state law solely on the basis of contem-
porary legal trends.14 The concurrence explained that a federal diversity court
ignores the forum's legitimate reasons for refusing to adopt a new legal doc:
trine by merely assuming that the state courts necessarily would follow the
trend. 5 The Martin concurrence stated that the Fourth Circuit's prediction
in Wilson was properly based on an accurate appraisal of current principles
of North Carolina law.5 The concurrence therefore concluded that the Wilson
holding should control in Martin.5
Although the majority in Martin found that Wilson was controlling on
the issue of whether North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doc-
trine, the dissent in Martin maintained that the Wilson prediction should not
control because the Wilson court's assessment of North Carolina law was
erroneous .5 The Martin dissent argued that North Carolina courts would not,
as Wilson predicted, hold as a matter of law that a plaintiff could never recover
on a crashworthiness claim." The dissent pointed out that according to North
Carolina law, the critical issue of causation usually presents a question of fact
for jury resolution.6" The dissent in Martin therefore reasoned that North
Carolina courts would not relieve a negligent automobile manufacturer from
liability by deciding as a matter of law that the manufacturer's wrongful act
was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries."
53. See 707 F.2d at 826. The Martin concurrence emphasized that a state court's analysis
of related issues reflects the underlying legal principles of the forum state. Id. at 827. The concur-
rence urged that any valid prediction of state law must involve the ascertainment and application
of the forum state's prevalent legal principles. Id.
54. Id. at 825.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 826-27. The concurrence in Martin urged that because the Wilson court based
its prediction on relevant indicators of North Carolina law, the decision was subject to criticism
only if those indicators proved to be irrational. Id. at 825. The concurrence determined that
the Wilson prediction was accurate because the indicators imply that North Carolina courts would
not hold an automobile manufacturer liable for defects that did not cause the accident. Id. at
827; see supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussing factors noted by Martin concur-
rence that support Wilson court's prediction that North Carolina would reject crashworthiness
doctrine).
57. See 707 F.2d at 827 (Phillips, J., concurring specially).
58. See id. at 827-28 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
59. See Id. The dissent in Martin noted that according to the Wilson court's holding, a
negligent automobile manufacturer will not be liable if a third party's negligence causes the accident,
regardless of whether the risk of enhanced injury is reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.
Id. at 827.
60. Id. at 827-28. The dissenting opinion in Martin pointed out that North Carolina courts
generally do not decide the issue of causation as a matter of law unless reasonable minds could
not differ as to the foreseeability of injury. Id. at 827; Williams v. Carolina Power & Light
Co., 296 N.C. 400, 403, 250 S.E.2d 255, 258 (1979).
61. See 707 F.2d at 827-28 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Martin dissent urged that North
Carolina courts have shown a willingness to impose liability on a negligent party when the court
cannot decide the question of causation as a matter of law. Id. The dissent explained that North
Carolina courts refuse to grant a summary judgment in favor of a negligent defendant when
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Additionally, the dissent noted that in Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. ,62
the Third Circuit predicted that North Carolina courts would allow an
actionable tort based on automobile crashworthiness. 3 The Seese court held
that North Carolina courts would impose a duty on automobile manufacturers
to design and produce a reasonably crashworthy vehicle." The Third Circuit
determined that North Carolina courts would find no legitimate reason for
limiting an automobile manufacturer's duty of care to eliminating only those
defects that might cause or contribute to a collision." The Martin dissent deem-
ed significant the fact that the entire panel of the Third Circuit in Seese agreed
that North Carolina courts would permit recovery on a crashworthiness claim."6
Since the Third Circuit had reached an opposite conclusion from the Wilson
court on whether North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine,
the dissent urged that the Fourth Circuit should reevaluate en banc the Wilson
panel's prediction of North Carolina law.
6
1
The dissent finally argued that the Fourth Circuit in Martin had disregarded
its obligation to accurately predict and apply state law by failing to reconsider
the Wilson decision en banc.6" The dissent stated that North Carolina courts
probably will not have the opportunity to examine the crashworthiness doc-
trine in the near future. 69 The dissent explained that the absence of a major
automobile producer in North Carolina meant that diversity of parties, and
thus federal jurisdiction,7" would exist in most crashworthiness cases brought
in North Carolina.7' Because there is little chance that a North Carolina court
will consider the crashworthiness issue, the dissent urged that the Fourth Cir-
cuit had a greater duty to correctly ascertain whether North Carolina would
a genuine issue of fact exists regarding the foreseeability of injury. Id. at 828; see Williams v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 403, 250 S.E.2d 255, 258 (1979).
62. 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981).
63. See 648 F.2d at 841.
64. Id. In holding that North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine, the Third
Circuit in Seese noted the absence of any expression by the North Carolina courts on the crash-
worthiness issue, as well as the conflicting federal court predictions regarding whether North
Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine. Id.; supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text
(discussing differing federal court predictions of North Carolina law). The Seese court determin-
ed that North Carolina courts would find the rationale underlying the imposition of crashwor-
thiness liability persuasive and therefore would adopt the doctrine. See 648 F.2d at 841; supra
note 4 (discussing rationale underlying crashworthiness doctrine). The Third Circuit also reason-
ed that North Carolina courts would choose to follow the "enlightened" weight of authority
and adopt the crashworthiness doctrine. See 658 F.2d at 841.
65. See 648 F.2d at 840.
66. See 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent in Martin noted that the
sole dissenter in Seese did not contend that North Carolina courts would reject the crashworthiness
doctrine, but merely disagreed with the manner in which the majority computed damages. Id.;
see 648 F.2d at 856 (Adams, J., dissenting) (case should be remanded for reassessment of damages).
67. See 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
68. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussion of dissent's contention in Mar-
tin that Fourth Circuit had special duty not to perpetuate erroneous precedent of Wilson).
69. See 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1948) (federal district courts have jurisdiction over disputes be-
tween citizens or corporations of different states when matter in controversy exceeds $10,000).
71. See 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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adopt the doctrine.7 2 The dissent in Martin concluded that the Fourth Circuit
erred in refusing to reconsider the Wilson holding en banc and thus perpetuating
the Wilson court's inaccurate prediction of North Carolina law.
73
The Martin concurrence's statement that the Wilson prediction is not sub-
ject to criticism74 is correct to the extent that the Wilson prediction properly
was based on factors indicating how North Carolina courts would resolve the
crashworthiness issue.75 To accurately predict state law, a federal diversity court
must ascertain and apply the forum's current policies and legal principles.
76
In predicting state law, the federal court also must utilize the same analytical
rules that the forum's highest court would apply to decide the contested issue.
77
Moreover, federal judges in diversity cases must refrain from interjecting their
personal views on the merits when predicting what rule the forum state courts
would adopt. 78 The Fourth Circuit's prediction of North Carolina law in Wilson
properly comported with these guidelines.
7 9
72. Id.
73. Id. The Martin dissent pointed out that the Fourth Circuit considers a panel decision
like Wilson binding precedent until the case is overruled following a rehearing en banc. Id. The
dissent therefore observed that the Fourth Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc in Martin com-
pelled the per curiam affirmance of the Wilson holding. See id. The Martin dissent also noted
that North Carolina lacks a referral statute, which would permit the Fourth Circuit to certify
the crashworthiness issue to the North Carolina Supreme Court for resolution. See id. at n.1.
74. See 707 F.2d at 825 (Phillips, J., concurring specially).
75. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussion of factors Fourth Circuit relied
on to predict North Carolina law in Martin and Wilson).
76. See Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 906 (1977) (federal diversity court predicting state law must consider legal principles
and policies that would control state court adjudication of issue); supra note 6 (discussing Federal
diversity court prediction of state law).
77. See First National Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 525 F.2d 966,
968 (5th Cir. 1976) (federal diversity court must use same methods that forum's courts would
use to decide question of law). In predicting state law, a federal diversity court must decide an
issue as if sitting as the highest court of the forum state. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183,
187 (1947). The federal court therefore must examine all relevant information and evidence that
the highest state court would consider in deciding a question of law. See West v. American Telegraph
& Telephone Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). The purpose of requiring a federal court to predict
state law using the same analysis that the forum's highest court would employ in resolving the
issue is to ensure that the prediction accurately reflects the rule the forum's state courts would
decide. See Tucker v. Paxson Machine Co., 645 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1981) (in absence of
controlling state decision federal diversity court must apply rule highest state court would follow).
78. See, e.g., McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240, 240 (4th Cir.) (federal diversity
court must refrain from fashioning state law according to personal choice), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 940 (1973); Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (role of
federal court is to predict decision of forum state's highest court rather than interject own opi-
nion on issue); Dyson v. General Motors Corporation, 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(federal diversity court must ascertain rule that state would follow rather than choose rule court
itself would adopt).
79. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit predictions in Martin and
Wilson properly premised on factors indicative of how North Carolina courts would decide crash-
worthiness issue). But see infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit reached er-
roneous conclusion on whether North Carolina would adopt crashworthiness doctrine because
court misinterpreted North Carolina law).
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As the concurrence in Martin pointed out, the Wilson court correctly iden-
tified the question of proximate cause as the critical issue underlying the
crashworthiness doctrine. 80 Judicial acceptance of the crashworthiness doc-
trine usually depends on whether the court considers the initial collision to
be the sole proximate cause of all accident-related injuries. 81 Any valid predic-
tion regarding whether North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doc-
trine therefore must take into account how North Carolina courts view the
causation issue.82 The Fourth Circuit in Wilson thus properly focused on how
North Carolina courts analyze proximate causation in the context of automobile
collisions.83
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's prediction in Wilson correctly was based
on relevant indicators of North Carolina law, rather than on an assumption
that the North Carolina courts would follow the weight of authority on the
crashworthiness issue.8 " As the concurrence in Martin emphasized, reliance
on contemporary trends in the law as a basis for predicting state law disregards
the legitimate reasons a state might have for not adopting the majority rule. 85
The Martin concurrence therefore properly examined North Carolina case law86
as well as prevalent state policies in the area of tort liability to support the
validity of the Wilson prediction.8" The Fourth Circuit also was correct in
not relying on the Third Circuit's prediction in Seese that North Carolina would
adopt the crashworthiness doctrine.88 The decision in Seese is subject to criticism
because the Seese court based its prediction on the persuasiveness of the doc-
trine instead of a critical analysis of North Carolina law.88 Conversely, the
Fourth Circuit in Martin and Wilson properly based its predictions on an
examination of relevant indicators of North Carolina law.9
80. See 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, J., concurring specially); infra notes 81-83 and accom-
panying text (proximate causation is critical issue in crashworthiness doctrine).
81. Compare Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Miss.
1974) (court rejected plaintiff's claim that defective seat harness caused enhanced injuries in plane
crash in part because alleged defect did not cause or contribute to accident) with Isaacson v.
Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1, 8 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (court found no rational basis for allow-
ing recovery only when negligent defects caused collision). See also Foland, supra note 4, at 612
(noting that causation issue frequently is subject of litigation in crashworthiness cases).
82. See 707 F.2d at 827 (Phillips, J., concurring specially).
83. See 707 F.2d at 826-27 (Phillips, J., concurring specially); supra notes 39-43 and
accompanying text (concurrence's discussion of proximate causation issue).
84. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (Wilson prediction properly was based
on evaluation of North Carolina state law).
85. See 707 F.2d at 825 (Phillips, J., concurring specially).
86. Id. at 826-27; see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (Martin concurrence's discus-
sion of North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Miller).
87. See 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, J., concurring specially); supra notes 45-49 and accom-
panying text (Martin concurrence's discussion of North Carolina's policy towards expansive tort
doctrines).
88. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (Third Circuit in Seese improperly predicted
North Carolina law on crashworthiness based on personal preference for doctrine).
89. See 648 F.2d at 841; supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussion of Third
Circuit's prediction of North Carolina law in Seese).
90. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Martin and Wilson
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Although the methods used by the Fourth Circuit to predict North Carolina
law in Wilson and Martin were sound, the prediction itself is inaccurate because
the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted North Carolina law.9' An examination of
current principles of North Carolina tort law indicates that the state courts
probably would allow recovery on a crashworthiness claim.92 North Carolina
law recognizes that more than one proximate cause of an injury may exist.
93
Additionally, under North Carolina law, an actor's negligence may be the pro-
ximate cause of injury even though the wrongful act did not immediately pro-
ceed the injury.9 North Carolina courts therefore would not, as the Martin
concurrence maintained, necessarily focus on the initial collision as the single
proximate cause of all accident-related injuries. 95 Moreover, North Carolina
courts have held that the intervening act of a third person will not relieve
a negligent party from liability if the intervening act was reasonably
foreseeable. 96 In crashworthiness cases, the automobile collision is the interven-
ing act between the original negligence of the manufacturer and the plaintiff's
injuries. 91 Since automobile collisions are reasonably foreseeable to a manufac-
used proper methods to predict North Carolina law on crashworthiness issue); notes 76-78 and
accompanying text (federal court must predict state law by ascertaining and applying forum's
legal principles).
91. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (North Carolina courts probably would
adopt crashworthiness doctrine because doctrine is consistent with North Carolina law).
92. See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text (crashworthiness liability is consistent
with North Carolina law).
93. See, e.g., Batts v. Faggert, 260 N.C. 641, 644, 133 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1963) (two distinct
proximate causes may combine to produce injury); Salter v. Lovick, 257 N.C. 619, 624, 127
S.E.2d 273, 276 (1962) (North Carolina law permits plaintiff to maintain negligence action against
two parties if both parties proximately caused injury); see also 9 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA
DIGEST, NEGLIGENCE § 10 at 366-67 (3d ed. 1977) (North Carolina law recognizes that more than
one proximate cause of injury may exist).
94. See Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App. 509, 512, 255 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1979) (proximate
cause of injury need not be last act of negligence); see also 9 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA DIGEST,
NEGLIGENCE § 10 at 266 (3d ed. 1977) (North Carolina law does not require that defendant's
negligent act be last in time to be proximate cause of injury).
95. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (under North Carolina law initial colli-
sion would not necessarily be sole proximate cause of injuries).
96. See, e.g., McNair v. Boyette, 15 N.C. App. 69, 72, 189 S.E.2d 590, 593 (negligent
party is not insulated from liability unless intervening act was unforeseeable), aff'd, 282 N.C.
230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972); Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 276 N.C. 398, 404,
172 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1970) (foreseeable intervening events will not relieve negligent defendant
from responsibility for injury); Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564, 571, 146 S.E.2d 806, 812 (1966)
(intervening act does not break causal connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
injury if act was reasonably foreseeable to defendant); Nance v. Parks, 266 N.C. 206, 211, 146
S.E.2d 24, 29 (1966) (intervening act does not insulate defendant from liability if act was reasonably
foreseeable). Under North Carolina law, the issue of whether the intervening act of a third party
was foreseeable is a jury question. See Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 491-92, 114 S.E.2d
241, 244 (1960). Moreover, when evidence exists indicating that the negligence of more than one
party may have proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, a judge must instruct the jury that
a finding that one party was negligent does not necessarily exclude others from liability. See
Warren v. Parks, 31 N.C. App. 609, 615, 230 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1976).
97. See Comment, The Crashworthy Vehicle: Heading For A Collision In The North Carolina
Courts, 18 WarE FoREsT L. REv. 711, 725 n.121 (1982) (automobile collision is intervening act
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turer, North Carolina courts probably would hold that an intervening colli-
sion does not insulate the manufacturer from liability for defects that cause
enhanced injuries, and thus would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine. 98
Furthermore, North Carolina courts would adopt the crashworthiness doc-
trine because the doctrine comports with the emphasis in North Carolina law
on foreseeability as the basis for imposing liability on a negligent party. 9
Because automobile collisions are reasonably foreseeable as incident to a
vehicle's expected use, the crashworthiness doctrine imposes liability for defects
that create unreasonable risks of increased injury during a collision."' ° The
rationale behind holding an automobile manufacturer liable for defects that
do not cause accidents but merely cause enhanced injuries is that the manufac-
turer should not escape liability if his negligence creates foreseeable risks of
harm.'0 1 North Carolina law similarly stresses foreseeability as the standard
for holding an actor liable for negligence. 02 North Carolina courts hold that
an actor's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries if the
risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable to the negligent party." 3 Since the
crashworthiness theory of liability is consistent with prevailing principles of
North Carolina tort law, North Carolina courts probably would not, as the
Fourth Circuit predicted in Martin and Wilson, deny recovery on a crash-
worthiness claim.1
0 4
The Fourth Circuit also erroneously held that North Carolina would re-
ject the crashworthiness doctrine because the state had refused to adopt other
because accident occurs after vehicle has been negligently designed or constructed).
98. See Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (North Carolina
courts would not limit recovery for negligent design or construction of vehicles to situations in
which defect caused initial collision).
99. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (North Carolina law and crashwcrthiness
doctrine both stress foreseeability of injury as justification for imposing liability on negligent party).
100. See Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (injurious
consequences of defects in vehicle's design or construction are reasonably foreseeable to automobile
manufacturers).
101. See, e.g., Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir. 1978) (fact that collision
precipitated injury to plaintiff should not release negligent automobile manufacturer from liability
since collisions are reasonably foreseeable); Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1,
8 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (fact that defect in automobile's design or construction did not cause accident
should not exempt manufacturer from liability if manufacturer's negligence created foreseeable
risks of harm); see also supra note 4 (discussion of rationale underlying imposition of crash-
worthiness liability).
102. See Nance v. Parks, 266 N.C. 206, 211, 146 S.E.2d 24, 27 (1966) (foreseeability of
injury is required for actionable negligence). See generally 9 STRONO's NoRT CAROLINA DIoEST,
NELIGENCE §§ 8-10.3, at 326-37 (3d ed. 1977) (noting that foreseeability of injury is basis for
determining liability for negligence under North Carolina law).
103. See, e.g., Kanoy v. Hinshaw, 273 N.C. 418, 426, 160 S.E.2d 296, 302 (1968) (test for
proximate cause is whether negligent party could have reasonably foreseen that injury was prob-
able under existing facts and circumstances); Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 68, 149 S.E.2d
590, 594 (1966) (same); Davis v. Jessup, 257 N.C. 215, 220, 125 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1962) (same).
104. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (North Carolina courts would not reject
crashworthiness doctrine since basis for imposition of crashworthiness liability is consistent with
North Carolina tort law).
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doctrines that liberalize tort recovery." 5 As the Martin concurrence correctly
noted, North Carolina courts have shown deference to the state legislature
in making substantial changes in common-law tort doctrine.' 6 The concur-
rence pointed out that North Carolina courts do not permit recovery on such
expansive tort theories as strict liability and comparative negligence. 07 The
concurrence, however, failed to recognize that North Carolina has refused
to adopt the doctrines of strict liability and comparative fault primarily to
preserve the defense of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery.'0
Since crashworthiness liability would have no effect on an automobile manufac-
turer's ability to raise the defense of contributory negligence, North Carolina's
reason for rejecting strict liability and comparative negligence does not apply
to the crashworthiness doctrine. Additionally, the crashworthiness doctrine
would not significantly alter an automobile manufacturer's duty of care as
presently defined by North Carolina law.0 9 The doctrine merely requires an
automobile manufacturer to exercise reasonable care in the design and con-
struction of vehicles.' l0 Present North Carolina law already charges automobile
manufacturers with a duty to use reasonable care in the design and produc-
tion of vehicles. I" Thus, because adopting the crashworthiness doctrine would
not result in a significant expansion of an automobile manufacturer's common-
law duty of care, North Carolina courts probably would adopt the crash-
105. See 707 F.2d at 826; Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960, 960 n.1 (4th Cir. 1981)
(noting that North Carolina's rejection of strict liability in recent state Supreme Court case im-
plied that North Carolina courts also would reject crashworthiness doctrine); supra notes 45-49
and accompanying text (Martin concurrence's discussion of North Carolina strict liability and
comparative negligence policies).
106. See 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, J., concurring specially).
107. Id.
108. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 837-38 (3d Cir. 1981) (North Carolina
Supreme Court has refused to adopt strict liability to preserve availability of contributory negligence
defense); Smith v. Fiber Control Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 678, 268 S.E.2d 504, 509-10 (1980) (recent
North Carolina legislation specifically reaffirms applicability of contributory negligence defense
by refusing to recognize strict liability); see also N.C. GEN . STAT. § 99B-4(3) (1982) (manufac-
turer not liable if plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care under circumstances and such failure
was proximate cause of injury).
109. See infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (crashworthiness doctrine would not
change automobile manufacturer's duty of care under North Carolina law); see also Comment,
The Crashworthy Vehicle: Heading For A Collision In The North Carolina Courts, 18 WAKE
FoRnsT L. Ray. 711, 724-28 (1982) (adoption of crasltworthiness doctrine in North Carolina would
not change manufacturer's duty of care under existing North Carolina law governing defective
design and construction of automobiles).
110. Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Isaacson
v. Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (manufacturer's duty under crash-
worthiness doctrine is to avoid subjecting persons to unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury).
111. See, e.g., Cassels v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.C. App. 51, 55, 178 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1970)
(manufacturer must use reasonable care in construction of vehicle); Dupree v. Batts, 276 N.C.
68, 74, 170 S.E.2d 918, 922 (1969) (automobile manufacturer must use reasonable care in selec-
tion of materials for product design); Gwynn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 126,




worthiness doctrine."' Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's predictions in Martin
and Wilson that North Carolina would reject the doctrine are incorrect inter-
pretations of North Carolina law."13
Unfortunately, however, jurisdictional barriers may prevent the North
Carolina state courts from correcting the Fourth Circuit's erroneous appraisal
of North Carolina law in the near future." ' As pointed out in the Martin
dissent, the lack of a major automobile producer in North Carolina indicates
that federal diversity jurisdiction will exist in most crashworthiness cases
brought in North Carolina. "' Furthermore, an automobile manufacturer sued
on a crashworthiness claim in a North Carolina state court is likely to remove
the case to a federal forum as long as the Fourth Circuit's favorable decisions
in Martin and Wilson remain dispositive." 6 Consequently, North Carolina
courts probably will not have an opportunity to rectify the Fourth Circuit's
inaccurate assessment of the state law in the near future." 7 Thus, the Martin
dissent was correct in arguing that the Fourth Circuit's failure to reconsider
the Wilson decision en banc will perpetuate a misinterpretation of North
Carolina law."'
In Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Fourth Circuit predicted
that North Carolina courts would not extend liability to automobile manufac-
turers for defects in a vehicle's design or construction that enhance accident-
related injuries." 9 Although the Martin court properly based its prediction
on relevant indicators of North Carolina law, the Fourth Circuit erroneous-
112. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (North Carolina courts would not con-
sider crashworthiness doctrine an unreasonable expansion of automobile manufacturer's duty
of care as defined by North Carolina law).
113. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text (North Carolina courts would not reject
crashworthiness doctrine because doctrine is consistent with state law).
114. See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text (jurisdictional barriers may prevent North
Carolina courts from addressing crashworthiness doctrine in near future).
115. See 707 F.2d at 828 n.1 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); supra notes 69-71 and accom-
panying text (discussion in Martin dissent concerning barriers to North Carolina state court jurisdic-
tion over crashworthiness cases).
116. See 707 F.2d at 828 n.1 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C. § 1141(a)-(b) (1976)
(defendant may remove case to any federal district court having jurisdiction over action).
117. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (jurisdictional barriers may prohibit
North Carolina courts from examining crashworthiness issue in near future). The fact that North
Carolina has not enacted a referral statute may serve to perpetuate the Fourth Circuit's inaccurate
decision in Wilson. See 707 F.2d at 828 n.1 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
AN. § 25.031 (1974) (state supreme court authorized to receive and answer certified question
of state law from federal appellate courts); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (1964) (same).
A referral statute would allow the Fourth Circuit to certify the unsettled crashworthiness ques-
tion to the North Carolina Supreme Court for resolution. See 707 F.2d at 828. The lack of a
referral statute means that federal courts must continue to predict North Carolina law concerning
the crashworthiness doctrine.
118. See 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 824 (per curiam); supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (stating per curiam
opinion in Martin).
120. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Martin used proper
methods to predict North Carolina law).
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ly concluded that North Carolina would reject the crashworthiness doctrine. 2 '
Prevailing principles of North Carolina law indicate that North Carolina courts
would not excuse an automobile manufacturer from liability when the manufac-
turer's negligence created unreasonable risks of foreseeable harm.' 22 Given
the continuing inconsistency of federal court interpretations of North Carolina
law regarding the crashworthiness doctrine,' 23 the Fourth Circuit in Martin
should have reconsidered en banc the validity of the Wilson prediction.
THOMAS CHRISTOPHER HAVENS
121. See supra notes 91-113 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's assessment of North
Carolina law in Martin is incorrect).
122. See supra notes 93-112 and accompanying text (crashworthiness doctrine does not con-
flict with North Carolina causation principles or significantly expand manufacturer's duty of
care as defined by North Carolina law).
123. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (conflict exists among federal courts predicting
whether North Carolina would adopt crashworthiness doctrine).
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